Will AI Make Grade Inflation Worse?
Maybe or maybe not—but it could rewrite the market for academic signaling.
For decades, “grade inflation” has been one of the most persistent critiques of American higher education. The complaint is straightforward: the same work that once earned a “C” now receives a “B,” and what was once a “B” is now an “A.” Economists have documented the steady rise of GPAs and the slow dilution of what an A once meant. According to multi-decade studies by Stuart Rojstaczer and Christopher Healy, the share of A’s awarded in U.S. colleges rose from roughly 15 percent in the 1960s to over 45 percent by the 2010s, and some elite universities now give A-range grades to more than two-thirds of students.
To many, this drift symbolizes a deeper institutional problem: universities have been rewarding enrollment and satisfaction. For those seeking mastery, GPAs rarely capture the depth of that effort relative to their less ambitious classmates.
Grade inflation didn’t happen because professors suddenly forgot what rigor looked like. It happened because the incentive structure rewarded leniency. Students give better evaluations to easy graders; departments prefer happy majors; administrators want high retention. Harsh grading creates friction and complaints, not bonuses or promotions. In aggregate, rational individuals acting in their own short-term interest created a long-term decline in standards.
Universities themselves face the same dilemma at the macro scale. They compete for applicants and tuition dollars. When peer institutions inflate grades, stricter universities appear worse at educating students.
And that equilibrium is probably permanent. Like credit-rating agencies grading the very clients that pay them, universities face a structural conflict of interest. How can these incentives be reversed? Students want high grades, universities want high enrollments, and employers see the same variance in candidates across institutions. The result is a stable but hollow system—one that challenges those who desire it but also certifies those who skimp on the work.
For the most ambitious students, skeptical parents, and frustrated employers, that hollowness is obvious. While some dive deep into their studies to earn a near-perfect GPA, another, probably larger, fraction can achieve similar grades with dramatically less work and care—if they are willing to pay university prices for the veneer of authentic achievement.
Grade inflation is not a moral failure; it is a market failure in which students, professors, universities, and employers are all harmed by attempting to subvert the degradation of standards.
AI as a Capability Shock
Artificial intelligence is not just a productivity enhancer; it is a capability shock. Until now, individual capability was bound tightly by skill. A student who could not code could not analyze large data sets. A student who struggled to write well also struggled to articulate complex arguments.
With skill barriers lowered or removed, any student—whether at a flagship state university or a small regional college—can access technical competence across multiple fields. A creative-writing student can run regression analyses; a computer-science student can embed legal reasoning into a program; a music major can model acoustics with physics-based AI. The scarce input is no longer skill—it’s curiosity, judgment, and taste.
Ultimately, this capability shock will flip the comparative advantage that specialists have held in the economy for decades. AI changes the kind of value humans bring to analysis. In the 1940s and 1950s, human computers—consider NASA prodigy Katherine Johnson—were prized for their precision and patience in performing complex calculations. Later, programmers and data scientists gained prestige by writing algorithms that could perform those same tasks faster and more reliably. Their value lay in learning programming languages and algorithmic concepts.
Today, AI is the consummate specialist: a capable, tireless, and extraordinarily fast executor of instructions. What it lacks is perspective and originality. The human comparative advantage has swiftly flipped to the generalist’s skillset—those who can define problems, interpret context, set constraints, and synthesize meaning. The work of the generalist—once reserved for the rare intellectual or technocrat who possessed both depth and breadth—is now accessible to the curious and intuitive.
The Implications for the Market for Excellence
The economics of higher education and entry-level job placement have long resembled Akerlof’s famous Market for Lemons. In the used-car market, sellers know more about the quality of their vehicles than buyers, creating a problem of asymmetric information. Buyers, unable to tell a lemon from a gem, assume the worst—and prices fall across the board.
Universities face a similar dynamic. Employers can’t easily observe a student’s actual capability, so they rely on proxies: GPA, school reputation, and polished résumés. Students, in turn, don’t fully know how “excellent” they are either. They rely on grades as feedback and as marketing—since their classroom work is often incomplete compared to the demands of a professional workplace. Over time, both sides play the signaling game: students optimize for grades, and universities—much like credit-rating agencies captured by their clients—strive to make high GPAs achievable.
It’s a messy equilibrium built on mutual opacity. And it works—until technology changes what students can illuminate to their potential employers.
AI is that shock. And while the market for GPAs will remain vigorous—especially in bureaucratic or highly regulated sectors—the market for finished work as proof of competence will grow dramatically. A detailed business plan no longer takes months of learning how to construct pro forma financial statements. Code repositories are now being produced directly by students who once would have needed years to master multiple programming languages.
Complete work is now easier than ever to produce and share—and employers can directly assess how sophisticated that work is. They don’t need to guess anymore. They can see what a candidate has built. The murky proxy of a grade loses relevance when evidence of skill is both abundant and auditable.
In that sense, AI doesn’t “end” grade inflation. It simply bypasses it. The currency of academic value—at least for those willing to prove it—shifts from certification to production.
This is not the downfall of universities, but the market for young professionals who rely on portfolios of accomplishment rather than GPAs will undoubtedly grow. Who will take up the mantle of encouraging and mentoring students’ creativity instead of their technical skills? Who will compete—at a fair price—for that training?
Conclusion: A Market Still in Motion
Artificial intelligence may not end grade inflation, but it will diminish the market failure that allows it to flourish by offering an emerging substitute for its credential. For decades, universities have controlled the supply of signals—transcripts, GPAs, and credentials—while employers have tried to infer meaning from those imperfect indicators. That information gap is closing fast.
In the emerging economy, the ability to produce verifiable, original, high-quality work will matter more than any grade-point average. A 4.0 may still open doors, but a portfolio of thoughtful, AI-assisted projects can now walk through them.
Universities that adapt—treating AI as a partner in rigor where appropriate rather than a threat to it—will thrive. Those that cling to the illusion that mastery must be unaided risk fading into irrelevance as capable students, guided by mentors and real-world projects, prove their worth directly in the market.
📚 Bibliography
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Bohanon, Cecil E., and Norman Van Cott. “A Note on the Economics of Grade Inflation.” Journal of Economic Education 36, no. 2 (2005): 160–65.
Bohanon, Cecil E. “Incentives and Grade Inflation: A Public Choice Perspective.” Journal of Private Enterprise 28, no. 3 (2013): 53–66.
Jewell, R. Todd, Michael A. McPherson, and Richard Tieslau. “Whose Fault Is It? Assigning Blame for Grade Inflation in Higher Education.” Applied Economics 45, no. 9 (2013): 1185–1200.
Rojstaczer, Stuart, and Christopher Healy. “Where A Is Ordinary: The Evolution of American College and University Grading, 1940–2009.” Teachers College Record 114, no. 7 (2012): 1–23.
Shetterly, Margot Lee. Hidden Figures: The American Dream and the Untold Story of the Black Women Mathematicians Who Helped Win the Space Race. New York: William Morrow, 2016.
Carter, Shannon, and Ruben Lara. “Grade Inflation in Higher Education: Is the End in Sight?” Academic Questions 29, no. 3 (2016): 331–44.
Schombert, James. “Introductory Astronomy as a Measure of Grade Inflation.” arXiv preprint arXiv:1008.4410 (2010).

